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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-COMMERCE CLAUSE-COMMERCE CLAUSE
CHALLENGES TO STATE HIGHWAY SAFETY REGULATIONS ARE
To BE REVIEWED UNDER A HIGHLY DEFERENTIAL
STANDARD
American Trucking Associations, Inc. v. Larson (1982)
In 1980, Pennsylvania enacted an amendment to the Pensylvania Mo-
tor Vehicle Code, prohibiting motor carrier vehicles from operating on the
Commonwealth's highways unless they "displayed a currently valid certifi-
cate of inspection" issued by Pennsylvania or by another state.' Several
state trucking associations sought to enjoin enforcement of the statute2 alleg-
ing that it violated, inter aha, the commerce clause of the United State
Constitution.
3
The United States District Court for the Middle District of Pensylvania
granted a temporary restraining order4 and on September 12, 1980 issued a
preliminary injunction. 5 Following further hearings, the court concluded
that the mandatory inspection requirement imposed an unconstitutional
burden on interstate commerce 6 and therefore, issued a permanent injunc-
1. 515 F. Supp. 1327, 1328 (M.D. Pa. 1981), rev'd, 683 F.2d 787 (3d Cir.), cert.
denied, 103 S. Ct. 448 (1982). The challenged statute, § 4703(a)(2) of the Penn-
sylvania Motor Code, provides: "No motor carrier vehicle shall be operated on a
highway unless it displays a currently valid certificate of inspection issued under this
chapter or by another state." 75 PA. CONS. STAT. § 4703(a)(2) (Purdon 1980). In
addition, the plaintiffs challenged regulations proposed by the Pennsylvania Depart-
ment of Transportation concerning the enforcement of § 4703(a)(2). See 683 F.2d at
789. See also 10 PA. BULLETIN 3397-98 (1980) (to be codified at 67 PA. ADMIN. CODE
§ 494).
2. 515 F. Supp. at 1328. American Trucking Associations, Inc., a federation of
state trucking companies including Pennsylvania Motor Truck Association, Coastal
Tank Lines, Inc., CRST, Inc., Smith Transfer Corp., Ryder Truck Lines, Inc. and
Preston Trucking Corp., challenged the statute. Id. Steamship Operators In-
termodal Committee (SOIC), "An unincorporated association whose members are
common carriers by water . . . engaged in the intermodal transportation of con-
tainerized cargo in the interstate and foreign commerce of the United States, was
permitted to intervene as plaintiff." Id.
3. 683 F.2d at 789. The commerce clause provides: "The Congress shall have
Power . . . To regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several
States .... ." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
The plaintiffs challenged § 4703(a)(2) as also violating the equal protection and
due process requirements of the Fourteenth Amendment. 683 F.2d at 789, 800. For
the court's consideration and dismissal of plaintiffs' Fourteenth Amendment chal-
lenges, see id. at 799-801.
4. 515 F. Supp. at 1329. On September 2, 1980, following the granting of the
temporary restraining order, SOIC was permitted to intervene. Id.
5. d.
6. Id. The district court concluded that Pennsylvania's motor carrier vehicle
inspection statute had only "illusory, slight or problematical safety benefits while it
[imposed] substantial burdens on interstate commerce." Id. at 1340. The district
(708)
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tion against the enforcement of section 4703(a)(2). 7
On appeal by the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, the United States
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit8 adopted a highly deferential stan-
dard of review9 and reversed, holding that the strong presumption of validity
accorded section 4703(a)(2) of the Pennsylvania Motor Code, as a highway
safety measure, had not been overcome by a showing that the safety benefits
derived therefrom were illusory, and accordingly found the statute to not
violate the commerce clause. American Trucking Associations, Inc. o. Larson, 683
F.2d 787 (3d Cir. 1982).
The United States Constitution grants Congress the power to regulate
commerce among the states.' 0 One purpose of this grant of power is to pro-
mote the national interest in free trade by restraining state action.'I Con-
gressional control over interstate commerce may be exercised concurrently
with state actions regulating transactions,occurring within the state.12 Fed-
eral legislation enacted under the commerce clause, however, supersedes con-
flicting state legislation and, if Congress intended that the federal regulation
preempt the subject matter of the statute, even parallel state action is pro-
court found that "[t]he cost for each inspection ...would range from $12.00 to
$18.00"; "[tihere would also be further costs connected with drivers' salaries and ad-
ditional fuel consumption;" and that delays in certain deliveries could force the shut-
down of production lines "at a cost of $6,000 per minute." Id. at 1333. In addition,
plaintiff Coastal Tank Lines estimated an additional annual costs in excess of
$150,000 in complying with the Pennsylvania mandatory inspection statute. Id. at
n.26. In reaching its conclusion the district court purported to apply the test formu-
lated by Justice Rehnquist in Kassel v. Consolidated Freightways Corp. See 450 U.S.
662, 691-92, 698-99 (1981) (Rehnquist, J. dissenting); notes 64-65 and accompanying
text infra.
7. 515 F. Supp. at 1329, 1340.
8. The case was heard by Judges Sloviter and Adams of the United States Court
of Appeals for the Third Circuit and Judge Van Artsdalen of the United States Dis-
trict Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, sitting by designation. Judge
Sloviter wrote the opinion for the court and Judge Adams filed a dissenting opinion.
9. 683 F.2d at 794-95. In choosing to follow the highly deferential standard of
review, the Third Circuit expressly rejected the balancing approach to commerce
clause jurisprudence. Id. at 795.
10. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. For the pertinent text of the commerce clause,
see note 3 supra.
11. G. GUNTHER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 113 (10th
ed. 1980). Professor Gunther notes that Alexander Hamilton urged the grant of com-
merce power to Congress to suppress the "interfering and unneighborly regulations of
some States" and advocated national control to avoid serious sources of animosity
and control. Id. (citing THE FEDERALIST No. 22 (A. Hamilton)). See also H.P. Hood
& Sons v. DuMond, 336 U.S. 525 (1949) ("Our system, fostered by the Commerce
Clause, is that every farmer and every craftsman shall be encouraged to produce by
the certainty that he will have free access to every market in the Nation, that no
home embargoes will withhold his exports, and no foreign state will ...exclude
them").
12. See, e.g., Huron Portland Cement Co. v. City of Detroit, 362 U.S. 440 (1960)
(city's smoke abatement code found valid notwithstanding federal statute regulating
the inspection and licensing of steam vessels); Maurer v. Hamilton, 309 U.S. 598
(1940) (state safety regulation given deference despite regulatory power of the Inter-
state Commerce Commission).
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hibited. 13 For example, in jones v. Rath Packing Co. ,14 the Supreme Court
determined that federal labeling requirements superseded parallel state la-
beling and packaging regulations on the basis that the implementation of
the state legislation would prevent the goals of Congress from being met.
15
When Congress has not acted in a particular area, the "dormant"
power of the commerce clause may still limit or preclude state regulation.
16
This dormant power of the commerce clause will arise when state regulation,
in an area in which Congress has remained silent, impedes the free flow of
commerce from state to state or interferes with the need for national uni-
formity in that area.17
For example, in 1824, in Gibbons v. Ogden 18 the Supreme Court applied a
dormant commerce clause analysis and invalidated a New York statute
which conferred exclusive navigation rights on that state's waterways. 19 The
Court broadly defined commerce as "intercourse between nations, and parts
of nations" 20 and included navigation in that broad definition. 2 ' The Court
determined ohat the state monopoly grant intruded upon the federal power
over commerce 22 and further found that, although no federal legislation reg-
ulated the New York waterways, the state monopoly conflicted with federal
laws licensing those engaged in coastal trade, and therefore, the statute was
13. See J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, HANDBOOK ON CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW 267 (1978 & Supp. 1982). If the subject is within the power of Congress to
regulate, Congress may preempt the area under the authority of the supremacy
clause of the U.S. Constitution.
14. 430 U.S. 519 (1977). InJones, respondant's challenged California net-weight
labeling statutes as contrary to federal legislation in that area. Id. at 523-24.
15. Id. at 543. The Court found that the "enforcement of [the California stat-
ute] would prevent 'the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and
objectives of Congress' in passing [the federal labeling regulations]." Id.
16. See Eule, Layiig the Dormant Commerce Clause to Rest, 91 YALE L.J. 425 (1982).
It is Congress that remains "dormant" when it has not acted in a particular area
where the commerce clause gives Congress such authority. Id. at 425 n. 1.
17. See, e.g., Southern Pac. Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761, 767 (1945). For a fur-
ther discussion of the Southern Pacific case, see notes 39-43 and accompanying text
i'nfra.
18. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824). The Gibbons Court declined to decide whether
all state legislation regulating commerce was precluded by the commerce clause, al-
though Chief Justice Marshall conceded that there was "great force" to this argu-
ment. Id. at 209-211.
19. Id. at 239-40. The state statute secured to Robert R. Livingston and Robert
Fulton exclusive navigation rights to all waters within the State of New York, for
boats moved by fire or steam. Id. at 1-2. Gibbons, the owner of two steamboats, was
enjoined from operating them between New York and Elizabethtown, New Jersey,
by virtue of the statute. Id. at 2.
20. Id. at 190.
21. Id. at 193. The Court provided that "[t]he mind can scarcely conceive a
system for regulating commerce. . . which shall exclude all laws concerning naviga-
tion . . ." Id. at 190. The Court thus found that "a [federal] power to regulate
navigation, is as expressly granted, as if that term had been added to the word 'com-
merce.' " Id. at 193.
22. Id. at 199-200.
[Vol. 28: p. 708
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also invalid under the supremacy clause. 23
Although in Gibbons the Court declined to decide the extent to which
the states retained the power to regulate commerce when Congress remained
silent, in 1851 the Court faced this issue in Cooley v. Board of Wardens,2 4 and
concluded that the commerce clause, by its own force, bars some, but not all,
state regulation. 25 The Cooley Court, as did the Gibbons Court, recognized
that the power to regulate commerce included the power to regulate naviga-
tion,2 6 but concluded that "the mere grant to Congress of the power to regu-
late commerce, did not deprive the State of the power to regulate
[navigation]," and that Congress, by not regulating this subject, had left
such regulation to the individual state.27
A state regulation which discriminates against out-of-state interests may
be found to substantially impede the free flow of interstate commerce and
accordingly found invalid under the commerce clause. 28 For example, in
City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey,29 the Court invalidated a New Jersey statute
23. Id. at 239-40. The Court determined that Congress had acted in this area by
way of a federal statute licensing such interstate commerce and that Gibbons held such
license pursuant to the act of Congress. Id. at 239. The exclusive grant of navigation
rights was thus held void under the supremacy clause. Id. at 210-11.
24. 53 U.S. (12 How.) 299 (1851). Cooley involved a commerce clause challenge
to a Pennsylvania law requiring vessels entering the Port of Philadelphia to engage
local pilots or pay a fine of one-half the cost of pilotage. Id. at 311. The plaintiff in
Cooley sought the return of fees levied against his vessels. Id.
25. Id. at 318, 319. The Cooley Court, in determining the validity of the statute,
considered whether the subject of regulation was of local or national interest. Id. at
319. The Court stated that,
[u]ntil Congress should find it necessary to exert its power, it should be left
to the legislation of the States; that [pilotage] is local and not national; that
[pilotage] is likely to be best provided for, not by one system..., but by as
many as the legislative discretion of the several States should deem applica-
ble to the local peculiarities of the ports within their limits.
Id.
26. Id. at 315. The Court further noted that the laws governing pilots "[did]
constitute regulations of navigation, and consequently of commerce, within the just
meaning of [the commerce clause] of the Constitution." Id. at 316.
27. Id. at 320. The Court found, in effect, that Congress had legislated on this
subject, but that the legislation manifested an intention to leave the power to regu-
late pilots to the individual state. Id.
28. See, e.g., Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322 (1979) (Oklahoma statute
prohibiting the transfer and sale of Oklahoma minnows out of the state found to be
discriminatory against interstate commerce); Hunt v. Washington State Apple Ad-
vertising Comm'n, 432 U.S. 333 (1977) (North Carolina apple-packaging statute
found to unduly burden interstate commerce); Great Atd. & Pac. Tea Co., Inc. v.
Cottrell, 424 U.S. 366 (1976) (Mississippi statute requiring reciprocal milk sale, not
justifiable as a health requirement, struck down as unduly burdening interstate com-
merce); Dean Milk Co. v. City of Madison, 340 U.S. 349 (1951) (city ordinance re-
quiring that all milk sold within city limits be pasteurized at a plant within five miles
of the city invalidated as discriminating against out-of-state interests); H.P. Hood &
Sons v. DuMond, 336 U.S. 525 (1949) (New York milk distribution licensing statute
struck down as it promoted local economic interests and discriminated against out-of-
state distributors).
29. 437 U.S. 617 (1978).
1982-83]
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prohibiting the importation of waste collected outside the state on the basis
that the statute erected a barrier against the movement of interstate trade
and thus discriminated against out-of-state commercial interests.
30
In addition, although a state statute may not be discriminatory, it may
still contravene the commerce clause if it imposes an undue burden on inter-
state commerce. 3 1 Moreover, state legislation will fall, in the absence of fed-
eral action, where national uniformity is inherently required in the area
being regulated.
32
The Supreme Court has applied varying analyses over the years in de-
termining whether a state statute contravenes the commerce clause. For ex-
ample, the Cooley Court adopted a balancing approach to determine whether
a Pennsylvania law, requiring the use of local pilots entering the Port of
Philadelphia, was a proper exercise of the state's power to regulate naviga-
tion. 33 By weighing the local interests in regulating navigation within the
state against any need for national uniformity in this area,34 the Court deter-
mined that the Pennsylvania law should be upheld. 35
The Court subsequently departed from the Cooley "balancing" ap-
30. Id. at 628. The Court determined that the New Jersey prohibition on the
importation of waste constituted protectionist legislation which imposed the full bur-
den of conserving New Jersey's remaining landfill space upon out-of-state commer-
cial interests. Id. The Court found that such discriminatory legislation fell squarely
within the area that the commerce clause was meant to protect. Id.
31. See, e.g., Southern Pacific Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761, 770-71 (1945). For a
further discussion of the Southern Panific case, see notes 39-43 and accompanying text
inra.
32. See, e.g., Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160 (1941). The petitioner in Ed-
wards was convicted for violating a California statute prohibiting the transportation
of a nonresident indigent person into California. Id. at 171. The Court recognized
that the commerce clause established an immunity from state interference respecting
all subjects which would require, under the authority of the commerce clause, regula-
tion by a single authority and that the transportation of people from state to state
was such a subject. Id. at 176 (quoting Milk Control Bd. v. Eisenberg Farm Prods.,
306 U.S. 346, 351 (1939)).
33. 53 U.S. (12 How.) at 319-21.
34. Id. at 319. The Court noted that those subjects of commerce which required
national uniformity were to be regulated solely by Congress, but that there was no
significant national interest in the regulation of pilots and pilotage and that "until
Congress should find it necessary to exert its power, it should be left to the legislation
of the States .... " Id.
35. Id. at 321. The Court held that, since the Pennsylvania pilotage statute did
not conflict with any Congressional law or regulation, and since it was enacted by
virtue of the state's power to legislate in that area, the statute was valid. Id. See
generally Schwartz, Commerce, the States, and the Burger Court, 74 N.W. L. REV. 409
(1979). Schwartz notes that the Cooley "balancing" approach requires weighing the
national and local interests involved in order to determine the validity of the state
regulation in question. Id. at 411-12.
See also Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137 (1970). The Pike Court asserted
that "[w]here the statute regulates evenhandedly to effectuate a legitimate local pub-
lic interest, and its effects on interstate commerce are only incidental, it will be up-
held unless the burden imposed on such commerce is clearly excessive in relation to
the putative local benefits." Id. at 142.
[Vol. 28: p. 708
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proach in South Caroha State Highway Department v. Barnwell Brothers .36 The
Barnwell Court, applying a rational-basis approach,37 determined that a
South Carolina statute regulating the width and weight of trucks using the
state's highways was valid because, although stricter than the standards of
surrounding states, the means of regulation chosen were reasonably adapted
to the ends sought.
3 8
In 1945, the Supreme Court returned to the Cooley "balancing" ap-
proach to commerce clause jurisprudence in Southern Pacific Co. v. Arizona. 39
Southern Pacific Co., an operator of interstate trains, challenged an Arizona
statute limiting the number of cars which could comprise a railroad train.
40
By balancing the state's asserted safety interest of reducing the number of
train accidents within the state41 against the burdens imposed upon the na-
tional interest in the free flow of interstate commerce and its freedom from
local restraints where national uniformity is necessary, the Court found the
Arizona train-length regulation invalid. 42 The Southern Paqfic Court distin-
36. 303 U.S. 177 (1938). The Barnwell Court recognized that Congress had the
authority to determine whether burdens imposed upon interstate commerce by state
regulation were impermissible and to secure uniformity in such areas by legislation,
but stated that in the absence of Congressional action, it was not a judicial function
to weigh burdens against benefits. Id. at 189-90 (citations omitted).
37. Id. at 195. When a court applies the "rational basis" test, it "will not second
guess the legislature as to the wisdom or rationality of a particular statute if there is a
rational basis for its enactment." See BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 1136 (rev. 5th ed.
1979).
38. 303 U.S. at 195. The Barnwel Court found that "the judicial function,
under the commerce clause . . . , stops with the inquiry whether the state legislature
in adopting regulations. . . has acted within its province, and whether the means of
regulation chosen are reasonably adapted to the end sought." Id. at 190 (citations
omitted). Thus, the Court concluded that South Carolina was not bound by the
judgment of other state legislatures, that the measures taken by the state were within
its legislative power and that the incidental burden on interstate commerce arising
from the South Carolina weight-width regulation was not forbidden. Id. at 195-96.
39. 325 U.S. 761 (1945). The Southern Pacift Court stated,
[T]he matters for ultimate determination here are the nature and extent of
the burden which the state regulation . . . , adopted as a safety measure,
imposes on interstate commerce, and whether the relative weights of the
state and national interests involved are such as to make inapplicable the
rule, generally observed, that the free flow of interstate commerce and its
freedom from local restraints in matters requiring uniformity of regulation
are interests safeguarded by the commerce clause from state interference.
d. at 770-71.
40. Id. at 763. The Arizona statute imposed fines on any person or corporation
operating a railroad train of more than 14 passenger or 70 freight cars within the
state. Id.
41. Id. at 776-79. Arizona asserted that, by regulating the length of trains,
"slack action" accidents would be reduced. Id. at 776. "Slack action is the amount
of free movement of one car before it transmits its motion to an adjoining coupled
car." Id.
42. Id. at 783-84. The Court concluded that the Arizona legislature had gone
too far in its regulation of train lengths in that the law passed beyond what was
plainly essential for safety since it did not appear that the regulation would lessen the
danger of an accident. Id. at 781-82. The Court concurred with the trial court's
1982-831
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guished the Barnwell decision on the grounds that in Barnwell the Court had
justified the state regulation as a highway safety measure and hence a sub-
ject of local concern. 43
The Court continued to follow a "balancing" approach in reviewing a
challenge to a nondiscriminatory state highway safety regulation in Bibb V.
Navajo Freight Lies.44 The Bibb "balancing" test weighed the safety benefits
sought to be achieved by the regulation against the burden the law imposed
upon interstate commerce. 45 The Court recognized that state safety meas-
ures carry a strong presumption of validity when challenged in a federal
court,46 but found that a regulation requiring "contour" mudflaps imposed
substantial costs upon those required to install them 47 and that additional
safety hazards were created by their use48 and thus held the purported safety
purposes to be outweighed by the national interests in free flowing
commerce.
49
In 1978, the Supreme Court, in Raymond Motor Transportation, Inc. v.
Rice, 50 invalidated Wisconsin highway safety regulations limiting the length
of trucks allowed on that state's highways. 5 1 Justice Powell, writing for the
finding "that the Arizona Train Limit Law, viewed as a safety measure, affords at
most slight and dubious advantage, if any, over unregulated train lengths .. " Id.
at 779.
43. Id. at 783. The Court noted that, "[u]nlike the railroads, local highways are
built, owned and maintained by the state. . . ." Id. One commentator notes that,
"[b]ecause the Barnwell law was aimed at both safety and highway conservation, it
was a justified exercise of state power despite the fact that what was said in Southern
Pacific might otherwise be fully applicable." Schwartz, supra note 35, at 415.
44. 359 U.S. 520 (1959). The Bibb plaintiffs challenged an Illinois statute re-
quiring that trucks and trailers using the state's highways be equipped with contour
mudguards. Id. at 521-22. The statute was challenged on the basis that it made the
straight mudflap, legal in an overwhelming majority of states, illegal in Illinois, thus
unreasonably burdening interstate commerce. Id. at 523.
45. Id. at 529-30. The Bibb Court considered the question of whether the state
interest in its safety regulation was so compelling as to outweigh the burden imposed
upon interstate commerce by the statute in question. Id.
46. Id. at 524, 529 (citations omitted).
47. Id. at 525. The Court noted that "the initial cost of installing [contour]
mudguards on all the trucks owned by the appellees ranged from $4,500 to $45,840"
and that there were also substantial costs relating to maintenance and replacement of
the mudguards. Id.
48. Id. The Court recognized that evidence had been introduced in the district
court which demonstrated that the contour mudguard "tended to cause an accumu-
lation of heat in the brake drum, thus decreasing the effectiveness of the brakes
• . . .. and that they were susceptible to falling off on the highway. Id.
49. Id. at 529-30. The Court also distinguished its findings from those made in
Bamwell by noting that the restrictions imposed by the Barnwel regulation "could
pass muster in any State" whereas the Illinois mudflap law was in direct conflict with
the legislation of a majority of states. Id. at 526.
50. 434 U.S. 429 (1978). The Wisconsin statute challenged in Raymond prohib-
ited the use of double-trailers or trucks exceeding fifty-five feet in length on the state's
highways without a special permit. Id. at 432-33.
51. Id at 430. The question considered by the Raymond Court was whether Wis-
consin's truck-length regulations "violate the Commerce Clause because they uncon-
[Vol. 28: p. 708
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Court, applied a balancing approach stating that the inquiry involves "a
sensitive consideration of the weight and nature of the state regulatory con-
cern in light of the extent of the burden imposed on the course of interstate
commerce," 52 and determined that the burden imposed upon interstate
commerce was no less than that imposed by the "mudflap" requirement in
Bbb, and thus invalidated the truck-length regulation. 53 More recently, in
Kassel v. Consohdated Freightways Corp. ,54 the Court considered a commerce
clause challenge to an Iowa truck-length statute, similar to the regulation
involved in Raymond.55 The Kassel opinion illustrates that the case created
much confusion within the Court as to the appropriate standard of review to
be followed. 56 Justice Powell, speaking for the plurality, 57 appeared to favor
a deferential standard of scrutiny,58 yet applied a "balancing" approach and
stitutionally burden or discriminate against interstate commerce." Id. at 430. The
United States District Court for the Western District of Wisconsin had previously
determined that the regulations did not impose an unconstitutional burden on inter-
state commerce. Id. See 417 F. Supp. 1352, 1358-61 (W.D. Wis. 1976).
52. 434 U.S. at 441. See generally Maltz, The Burger Court, the Regulation ofInterstate
Transportation and the Concept of Local Concern: The Jursprudence of Categories, 46 TENN.
L. REV. 406, 417 (1979). Maltz notes that the Raymond Court relied heavily on Pike v.
Bruce Church in drawing this conclusion even though the statute invalidated in Pike
was discriminatory on its face. Id. at 417, 418 n.73. See Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc.,
337 U.S. 137 (1970). Maltz also asserted that the Raymond Court did not rule out
"localness" as an important element in commerce clause jurisprudence, but that the
local-national interest distinction was embedded in the Raymond "balancing" ap-
proach as the Court reaffirmed the strong presumption of validity accorded to state
safety regulations. Maltz, supra, at 418. For a further discussion of the Pike decision,
see note 35 supra.
53. 434 U.S. at 446. The Raymond Court concluded that the challenged regula-
tions violated the commerce clause because they substantially burdened interstate
commerce and because the "State of Wisconsin failed to make even a colorable show-
ing that its regulations contribute[d] to highway safety." Id. at 447-48. In his con-
curring opinion, Justice Blackmun sought to emphasize the narrow scope of the
Raymond decision by asserting that the Court did not make a legislative choice, but
concluded that the safety interests asserted had not been shown to exist as a matter of
law. Id. at 450 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
54. 450 U.S. 662 (1981).
55. Id. at 664. The Iowa statute challenged in Kassel prohibited the use of 65
foot double trailers within the state's borders. Id. at 665. Iowa defended the statute
against the constitutional challenge "as a reasonable safety measure enacted pursu-
ant to its police power." Id. at 667. Iowa justified its position by presenting evidence
that 55 foot single trailers were superior to 65 foot double trailers in the area of
highway safety. Id. at 672.
56. See American Trucking Association, Inc. v. Larson, 683 F.2d 787, 793 (3d
Cir. 1982). The Third Circuit noted that the Kassel Court was "openly divided on
the issue of which analytical approach to apply in examining the constitutionality of
Iowa's scheme and no opinion was denominated as the Opinion of the Court." Id.
See also Note, State Regulation of Interstate Transportation, 95 HARv. L. REV. 93 (1981).
57. Justice Powell's opinion was joined by Justices Blackmun, Stevens and
White. Justice Brennan, joined by Justice Marshall, filed a separate concurring opin-
ion. Justice Rehnquist, joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justice Stewart, filed a
dissenting opinion.
58. 450 U.S. at 670. Justice Powell stated that "if safety justifications are not
illusory, the Court will not second guess legislative judgment about their importance
1982-83]
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determined that the truck-length regulations imposed substantial burdens
upon interstate commerce, in the form of costs and delays, 59 without a signif-
icant countervailing safety interest.60 Justice Powell characterized the state's
asserted interest in highway safety as illusory61 and concluded that, since the
"regulations impair significantly the federal interest in efficient and safe in-
terstate transportation, the [statutes] cannot be harmonized with the com-
merce clause."'62 Justice Powell thus invalidated the Iowa truck-length
limitations as unconstitutionally burdening interstate commerce. 63 Justice
Rehnquist, dissenting in Kassel, contended that a highly deferential standard
of review was applicable and that highway safety regulations were entitled
to the strongest presumption of validity against commerce clause chal-
lenges.64 Thus, the dissent rejected the balancing approach and opined that
the majority had "overstep[ped its] 'limited authority to review state legisla-
tion under the commerce clause.' "65
Against this background, the Third Circuit considered the question of
whether a state's nondiscriminatory highway safety regulation should be ex-
amined under the "balancing" approach or under a highly deferential stan-
in comparison with related burdens on interstate commerce." Id. (quoting Raymond
Motor Transp., Inc. v. Rice, 434 U.S. at 449). See also Note, supra note 56, at 95.
59. 450 U.S. at 674. Justice Powell noted that compliance with the Iowa statute
would require trucking companies to detach their 65 foot double trailers and ship
them through Iowa separately or to route the trailers around Iowa. The evidence of
record indicated that the statute would impose an additional $12.6 million each year
in costs to the trucking industry. Id.
60. Id. at 678.
61. Id. at 671. Justice Powell recognized statistical studies which "supported the
view that 65 foot doubles [were] at least as safe overall as 55 foot singles. ... Id. at
673. Justice Powell stated that Iowa's effort in supporting the safety rationale of its
statute was much more serious than that of the State of Wisconsin in Raymond, but he
regarded its effort as no more persuasive. Id. at 671-72.
62. Id. at 671.
63. Id. Justice Brennan concurred with this result, but contended that the bal-
ancing test should be one of weighing the burdens imposed on interstate commerce
against those benefits actually sought to be achieved by the state legislature, 1'e., the
articulated purpose of the legislation, "not against those suggested after the fact by
counsel." Id. at 680 (Brennan, J., concurring). Justice Brennan also asserted that
commerce clause challenges must take into account that protectionist legislation,
even when safety related, is per se unconstitutional. Id. Justice Brennan noted that
Iowa, through its truck-length statute, attempted to "shut off its fair share of the
burden of maintaining interstate truck routes" by making the "Nation's highways as
a whole, more hazardous." Id. at 686 (Brennan, J., concurring).
64. Id. at 691-93 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Justice Rehnquist noted that the
strong presumption of validity' accorded highway safety measures could be over-
come only when the safety benefits were 'slight or problematical.' " Id. at 692 (Rehn-
quist, J., dissenting) (quoting Bibb v. Navajo Freight Lines, 359 U.S. at 524).
65. Id. at 687 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (quoting Brotherhood of Locomotive
Fireman v. Chicago, R.I. & P.R. Co., 393 U.S. 129 (1968)). Justice Rehnquist as-
serted that a balancing approach makes an empty gesture of the strong presumption
of validity accorded state safety measures. Id. at 691 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Jus-
tice Rehnquist concluded that the statute was not unconstitutional as Iowa had pro-
duced sufficient evidence that a rational relation existed between highway safety and
its truck length regulation. Id. at 694 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
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dard of review, in determining whether the statute unduly burdened
interstate commerce.
66
Judge Sloviter67 began her analysis by examining the apparent division
among the Justices of the United States Supreme Court as to which legal
standard federal courts should apply in reviewing a state safety regulation
chillenged under the commerce clause. 6 8 The Third Circuit acknowledged
that highway regulation has been given special deference 6 9 and recognized
that the division among the Justices has arisen chiefly in cases in which the
Court "invalidated state regulation purportedly enacted in the name of
highway safety." 7 ° Although the "balancing" approach was clearly sup-
ported by a majority of the Court in the earlier highway-safety cases, the
Third Circuit noted that multiple opinions in the more recent cases indicate
a divergence of views. 71 The court paid particular attention to the split of
the Justices in Kassel, comparing Justice Powell's "balancing" approach with
Justice Rehnquist's "highly deferential" standard.
72
Next, the American Trucking court determined that it would adopt the
"highly deferential" standard of review of commerce clause jurisprudence
66. 683 F.2d at 794. The court stated that it was not confident that the selection
of the legal standard would not be outcome determinative. Id. at 794-95.
67. Judge Sloviter was joined in her opinion by Judge Van Artsdalen with
Judge Adams dissenting.
68. 683 F.2d at 790-94. This examination was concerned mainly with the divi-
sion of Justices in the Court's recent plurality opinion in Kassel. Id. at 793-94. For a
discussion of the Kassel opinions, see notes 54-65 and accompanying text supra.
69. 683 F.2d at 790. The majority noted that the issue of state power arises only
upon Congress' inaction. Id. One commentator has recently opined that a more
appropriate basis for analysis of discriminatory or disproportionate state legislative
treatment of commerce might exist with the privilege and immunities clause of Arti-
cle IV. See Eule, supra note 16, at 428. The American Truckzng majority noted Profes-
sor Eule's theory but found itself bound by precedent in the area of commerce clause
jurisprudence. 683 F.2d at 790.
70. 683 F.2d at 791. The court noted that the Supreme Court had invalidated
state highway safety regulations only three times in the preceeding 30 terms. Id. The
court determined that it was from the trilogy of highway regulation cases that the
proper analytical approach was to be derived. Id. (citing Bibb v. Navajo Freight
Lines, 359 U.S. 520 (1959); Raymond Motor Transp., Inc. v. Rice, 434 U.S. 429
(1978); Kassel v. Consolidated Freightways Corp., 450 U.S. 662 (1981)).
71. d. at 791-94. The Ameruzan Trucking court characterized the 1959 Bibb deci-
sion as a "balancing" approach, where state safety interests were found to be out-
weighed by a heavy burden on interstate commerce. Id. at 791. See Bibb v. Navajo
Freight Lines, 359 U.S. 520 (1959). Judge Sloviter saw the disagreement between the
plurality and concurring Justices in Raymond as a split on the proper scope of judicial
inquiry in the balancing process. 683 F.2d at 792-93. See Raymond Motor Transp.,
Inc. v. Rice, 434 U.S. 429 (1978). Most recently, on the "openly divided" Kassel
Court, the plurality followed the balancing approach, but the concurring and dis-
senting Justices, five in all, seemed to reject the balancing rule. 683 F.2d at 793-94.
See Kassel v. Consolidated Freightways Corp., 450 U.S. 662 (1981).
72. 683 F.2d at 793-94. For a further discussion of the dichotomy existing
within the Burger Court in light of Kassel, see notes 54-65 and accompanying text
supra.
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articulated by Justice Rehnquist in his Kassel dissent.7 3 The. majority de-
cided to follow this "highly deferential" standard of review in determining
the constitutionality of Pennsylvania's mandatory inspection statute for sev-
eral reasons.74 First, the court contended that, in aligning the Justices in
Kassel, five of the Justices appear to have rejected the "balancing" approach
in the area of state safety regulation.7 5 Second, the court opined that the
more deferential standard is preferable "because issues of highway safety
have always been considered of a 'peculiarly local nature.' "76 Lastly, the
Third Circuit expressed its reluctance "to superimpose judicial values over
legislative values" where safety is the concern of the legislation in question. 77
After adopting this "highly deferential" standard of review, the court
proceeded to determine whether the "strong presumption of validity '78 ac-
corded Pennsylvania's mandatory inspection statute had been overcome by
a showing that the safety benefits sought to be derived therefrom were
merely illusory. 79 Upon review of the evidence presented, the Third Circuit
concluded that the presumption had not been overcome and also that the
record provided ample support for the safety justification of the Penn-
sylvania inspection statute.80 The majority noted that the Commonwealth
only had to show that the legislature had a reasonable basis to believe that
inspection of motor carrier vehicles was likely to uncover mechanical defects
and that such defects contributed to accidents. 81 In this case, the court con-
73. 683 F.2d at 795. The majority felt that, since it was not confident that the
standard selected would not be outcome determinative, it was incumbent upon the
Third Circuit to expressly select an appropriate standard. Id. at 794-95. For a fur-
ther discussion of the highly deferential standard of review as developed by Justice
Rehnquist in his Kassel dissent, see notes 64-65 and accompanying text supra.
74. 683 F.2d at 795.
75. Id. For a further discussion of the division of the Justices in the Kassel opin-
ion, see notes 54-65 and accompanying text supra.
76. 683 F.2d at 795 (citing Bibb v. Navajo Freight Lines, 359 U.S. at 523). The
court noted that "[i]f the rational basis standard is considered adequate in equal
protection cases . .. a similarly deferential standard should suffice as the standard
for evaluating nondiscriminatory state commercial regulations in the field of highway
safety." 683 F.2d at 795.
77. Id. The American Trucking court asserted its belief that "the halls of the state
legislature are a more appropriate forum for resolution of [challenges of state high-
way safety regulations] than are the walls of a judge's chambers." Id. In addition the
court noted that "[a]s long as the statute does not on its face or in fact discriminate
against out-of-state interests or in favor of in-state interests, there is ample protection
from such legislation in the democratic process itself." Id.
78. Id. See generally Bibb v. Navajo Freight Lines, 359 U.S. at 524 (recognizing
that state safety measures carry a strong presumption of validity when challenged in
federal courts).
79. 683 F.2d at 795.
80. Id. at 799. The court determined that it was not the burden of the state "to
prove that uninspected motor carrier vehicles are, by definition, unsafe" nor was it
the function of the court to decide whether the evidence was such as to convince the
court that an inspection requirement was warranted. d. The court would not rule
on the wisdom of the legislative decision once it found evidence supporting the legis-
lature's choice. Id.
81. Id. The majority asserted that "[i]t is difficult to conclude that Pennsylvania
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cluded that the Commonwealth had presented sufficient evidence to support
its claim that the inspections had some safety benefits.
8 2
In a vigorous dissent, Judge Adams recognized that the judicial role in
"dormant" commerce clause cases should be a limited one, but found that
the "balancing" approach was the proper standard of review to be applied
when a federal court examines the validity of state highway safety regula-
tions.8 3 Judge Adams recognized that "situations may arise where enormous
burdens are placed on interstate commerce by nondiscriminatory,, non-illu-
sory state safety statutes," and stated that a weighing of interests was re-
quired to prevent a minor or marginal safety objective from imposing a
significant burden on national commerce. 84 In this case Judge Adams felt
that a weighing of the asserted safety purpose against the degree of interfer-
ence on interstate commerce, in the form of a cost-benefit analysis, 85 would
has not met that minimal requirement, particularly when it is balanced against a
burden on interstate commerce stemming merely from an inspection requirement
rather than total exclusion, as in the case of oversized vehicles. Id. The court noted
this fact, as well as the absence of any discriminatory provisions, in distinguishing the
Pennsylvania statute from those invalidated by the Supreme Court in Bibb, Raymond,
and Kassel. Id. See notes 44-65 and accompanying text supra.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 801 (Adams, J., dissenting). Judge Adams acknowledged the wisdom
of limited judicial review in this area "not only because courts generally are ill-
equipped to evaluate the wisdom of legislation intended to promote safety, but also
because Congress always retains the ability, through the exercise of its plenary pow-
ers, to invalidate any state regulation that it deems to be an intrusion on the commer-
cial interests of the nation." Id. However, Judge Adams maintained that the
"sensitive" balancing proposed by the Kassel plurality was necessitated by "the long
standing notion that the commerce clause exists, in part to 'prevent the States from
erecting barriers to the free flow of interstate commerce.' " d. at 803-04 (Adams, J.,
dissenting) (citation omitted).
84. Id. at 803 (Adams, J., dissenting). In countering those reasons articulated by
the majority in adopting the highly deferential standard of review, Judge Adams
noted first that, although five Justices have apparently questioned the legitimacy of
the "balancing" approach, neither approach to commerce clause challenges has re-
ceived majority recognition. Id. at 802. Next, Judge Adams opined that, although
state highway safety regulation may be of a "peculiarly local nature," it does not
necessarily follow that the statute in question should be reviewed under a deferential
standard, similar to that standard followed in the examination of state commercial
legislation, since the regulation in question affects the activities and interests of un-
represented outsiders in addition to those of its citizens. Id. Lastly, Judge Adams
took exception to the majority's finding that questions of state highway safety regula-
tion are better left to the legislature than to the judiciary, as he could not find that
"absolute judicial reticence is appropriate when reviewing the actions of state legisla-
tures, whose safety-related judgments, essentially attuned to local considerations, do
not necessarily reflect an adequate comprehension or consideration of the burdens
placed on interstate intercourse." Id. at 802-03 (Adams, J., dissenting) (emphasis in
original). For a further discussion of the "balancing" approach as applied by the
Kassel plurality, see notes 58-63 and accompanying text supra.
85. 683 F.2d at 804 (Adams, J., dissenting). Judge Adams opined that "the bet-
ter judicial practice would take into account costs as well as benefits; it would bal-
ance local safety objectives against 'the national interest in keeping interstate
commerce free from interferences which seriously impede it.' " Id. (quoting Bibb v.
Navajo Freight Lines, 359 U.S. at 524) (citation omitted).
1982-83]
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result in a finding that the mandatory inspection statute overwhelmingly
burdens interstate commerce and thus could not survive constitutional
scrutiny.
8 6
Upon review of the American Trucking decision, it is submitted that, in
order to achieve a desired result, the majority arbitrarily chose to follow the
highly deferential standard of review, as the outcome obtained in this case
was determined by the approach selected by the Court.8 7 It is suggested that
the only means by which the court could find section 4703 (a) (2) to be a valid
state highway safety measure was through the application of a highly defer-
ential approach to the challenge of the regulation.8 8
Although the balancing approach did not receive majority support in
Kassel, it is suggested that the highly deferential standard of review received
even less support from the Kassel Court.89 It is also contended that, al-
though highway safety may be of a "peculiarly local nature," the courts
ought to give consideration to the effects of a statute on interstate com-
merce.9° In addition, although courts must approach state legislation deli-
cately in order not to intrude on the legislative process, the courts cannot
disregard the fact that state legislatures may not necessarily take into ac-
count the national interests affected by their legislation.9
It is submitted that, although unsupported by a majority in any recent
commerce clause challenge to a state safety regulation, the "balancing" ap-
proach provides the better analytical approach to commerce clause jurispru-
dence.92 In weighing the burdens imposed upon interstate commerce, such a
86. Id. at 804 (Adams, J., dissenting). Judge Adams noted that "[ilt is difficult
to quarrel with the conclusions drawn by the district court . . . in this case," which
included uncontradicted evidence that the inspection statute would disrupt opera-
tions, raise costs and delay service, factors considered significant by the Raymond
Court. Id. at 805 (Adams, J., dissenting). Judge Adams stated that he "would hold
that, under the balancing test, the undisputed burdens on interstate commerce result-
ing from Pennsylvania's inspection program outweigh what the district court found
to be speculative and unsubstantiated promises of improved highway safety." Id. at
806 (Adams, J., dissenting).
87. See 683 F.2d at 794-95. The American Trucking majority recognized that in
selecting a standard there was a probability that it would be determining the out-
come of the case. See id.
88. See id. The majority, however, noted that the Pennsylvania inspection stat-
ute might survive the "balancing" test but determined that it need not decide that
issue. Id. at 799.
89. See id. at 801 & n.1, 802 (Adams, J., dissenting); Kassel v. Consolidated
Freightways Corp., 450 U.S. 662, 687 (1981) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Judge Ad-
ams also notes the recent support for the "balancing" approach in Pike v. Bruce
Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137 (1970), in which seven Justices joined in applying the
"balancing" test to a state "health and safety" category. 683 F.2d at 801 n.1 (Adams,
J., dissenting).
90. See 683 F.2d at 803 (Adams, J., dissenting).
91. See id. at 802-03 (Adams, J., dissenting). For a further discussion of Judge
Adams' disagreement with the majority's reasoning, see notes 83-86 and accompany-
ing text supra.
92. See id. at 803 (Adams, J., dissenting). See generally notes 83-86 and accompa-
nying text supra.
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lost time and profits, against the safety interests of the state, the "balancing"
approach enables the federal courts to reconcile legitimate state safety objec-
tives with "the national interest in keeping interstate commerce free from
interferences which seriously impede it."
'9 3
The most immediate impact of the American Trucking decision is that,
as a result of the Third Circuit's adoption of a highly deferential standard of
review and validation of Pennsylvania's mandatory inspection statute, Penn-
sylvania becomes "the only state in the nation to restrict access to its high-
ways to those trucks that have received a state sponsored safety
inspection." 94 Consequently, an enormous burden is placed upon a great
number of out-of-state carriers, not required to undergo inspection in any
other state, once the statute becomes effective. 95 With the Supreme Court's
refusal to grant certiorari in the American Trucking case, 9 6 it is submitted that
other jurisdictions may attempt to create similarly burdening legislation
under the guise of state safety regulation.
9 7
It is also submitted that, in the absence of a definitive answer by the
Supreme Court as to the proper standard of review to be followed in com-
merce clause challenges of state safety regulations, other federal courts will
remain free to decide for themselves which standard, if either, provides the
better means of analysis. 98 It is suggested that the highly deferential stan-
dard of review followed by the Third Circuit may prevail in other circuits as
the Supreme Court's denial of certiorari may be treated as a signal of the
validity of the deferential approach. 9 9
In conclusion, it is submitted that, although "the commerce clause is
* . . a grant of authority to Congress, not to the courts,"m ° the courts must
93. Bibb v. Navajo Freight Lines, 359 U.S. at 524. See 683 F.2d at 804 (Adams,
J., dissenting). For a further discussion of the cost-benefit balancing analysis pro-
posed by Judge Adams in his dissent, see note 85 supra.
94. 683 F.2d at 807 (Adams, J., dissenting).
95. See id. at 804 (citing American Trucking Associations, Inc. v. Larson, 515 F.
Supp. 1327, 1330 (M.D. Pa. 1981)). Judge Adams repeated the findings of the dis-
trict court that "nearly one million out-of-state vehicles... would be affected" and
that the costs of inspections and the delays created thereby imposed substantial bur-
dens on the trucking industry. Id. at 804-05 (Adams, J., dissenting). See generally
American Trucking Associations, Inc. v. Larson, 515 F. Supp. 1327, 1330, 1332-34
(M.D. Pa. 1981).
96. 103 S. Ct. 448 (1982).
97. See 683 F.2d at 803 (Adams, J., dissenting). Judge Adams asserts that regu-
lations which clearly promote highway safety will pass muster under a deferential
standard of commerce clause review, regardless of their unreasonableness or their
negative impact upon interstate commerce. Id. at 803-04 (Adams, J., dissenting).
98. See 683 F.2d at 794. The American Trucking majority recognizes that, since
the Supreme Court has failed to accept a common standard, it would be
presumptous for the Third Circuit to attempt to reconcile the two approaches set out
by the Kassel Court. Id.
99. 103 S. Ct. 448 (1982).
100. 450 U.S. at 690 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
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act to dispel the confusion in this area as long as Congress remains silent.
James C Preston, Jr.
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